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In 1992, the Norwegian delegation introduced the concept of joint implementation (JI) into the 
negotiations for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) aimed at, in the 
long term, stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere. At the Rio Conference 
on Environment and Development, JI was put into the final text of Article 4.2 of the FCCC that 154 
countries and the European Union signed. This is deemed a breakthrough for JI as a climate policy 
instrument. The inclusion of JI in the FCCC is also be widely regarded as a first step towards a global 
regime of tradeable GHG emission permits. 
 In brief, JI means that the investor country invests in emission abatement projects in another 
(host) country where the costs of abating GHG emissions are lower than trying to achieve an equivalent 
abatement within the own country and is credited, in whole or in part, for emission abatements in its 
own GHG accounts. Thus, JI offers the potential for lowering the global costs of abating GHG 
emissions. 
 
 
Economic rationale for JI projects with China 
 
China's contribution to global CO2 emissions, which is high already, is expected to grow significantly 
(see Table 1). Thus, advocates of controlling CO2 emissions call for substantial efforts in China. 
However, the Chinese authorities have claimed that China cannot be expected to make a significant 
contribution to solving the carbon emission problem, by arguing that ignoring the industrialized 
countries' responsibility for the majority of global CO2 emissions and simply asking for special action on 
China's part would seriously harm China's economic development and improvement of living standards. 
Then, what are the economic effects of possible future carbon limits for China? How can we encourage 
China's participation, given the global characteristics of climate change and China's importance as a 
source of future CO2 emissions in line with its industrialization and urbanization? 
 Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Chinese economy, Zhang (1997a, 
1998) has analysed the implications of two scenarios under which China's CO2 emissions in 2010 will 
be cut by 20% and 30% respectively relative to the baseline. The two emission targets are less restrictive 
in that they are not compared with the level of emissions in a single base year, but with the baseline CO2 
emissions in 2010, the latter being 2.46 times that in 1990. The carbon tax required to achieve a 20% cut 
(Scenario 1) in CO2 emissions in 2010 relative to the baseline is estimated to be US$ 18 at 1987 prices, 
while the corresponding figure necessary to achieve a 30% cut (Scenario 2) in CO2 emissions in 2010 is 
estimated to be US$ 35 at 1987 prices. 
 Even under the two less restrictive carbon emission scenarios, China's gross national products 
(GNP) drop by 1.5% and 2.8% respectively in 2010 relative to the baseline, indicating that the economic 
losses tend to rise more sharply as the degree of the emission reduction increases. Given the fact that 
most studies surveyed by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) second assessment 
report estimate that the economic losses under very restrictive carbon limits (e.g. the stabilization or 
even 20% below 1990 levels in 2010) are reported not to exceed 2% of GNP for the OECD countries, 
the above results clearly indicate that China would be one of the regions hardest hit by carbon limits. 
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This, combined with the developed countries being responsible for the majority of global CO2 
emissions, explains the Chinese government stance in carbon abatement. 
 Table 2 shows the carbon tax levels across the countries and regions considered. It can be seen 
that the carbon taxes required in China in order to achieve the same percentage of emission reductions 
relative to the baseline are much lower than those of the developed countries and the world average. 
This provides the economic rationale for the development of JI projects with China. Indeed, it is in the 
direct interest of the developed countries to encourage such a take-up, since this will act as a relief of 
pressure on these countries for yet more stringent measures to reduce their GHG emissions. 
 
 
Table 1  Energy-related results for the baseline scenario of the Chinese economy 
 
             1990 2000 2010 
Energy consumption (million tce (tons of coal equivalent)) 
Energy consumption per capita (tons of coal equivalent) 
Coal (million tons) 
Coal's share in total energy consumption (%) 
Electricity (terawatt-hours) 
Energy intensity of GNP (tce per million yuan) 
Elasticity of energy consumption with respect to GNP 
Elasticity of electricity consumption with respect to GNP 
Average annual rate of energy conservation (%) 
CO2 emissions (million tons of carbon) 
CO2 emissions per capita (tons of carbon) 
987.0 
0.86 
1055.2 
76.2 
623.0 
717 
0.56a 
0.84a 
3.60a 
586.9 
0.51 
1546.4 
1.19 
1578.9 
72.9 
1395.7 
504 
0.55a 
1.01a 
3.46a 
898.9 
0.69 
2560.4 
1.80 
2418.2 
67.5 
2745.2 
403 
0.68a 
0.93a 
2.21a 
1441.3 
1.01 
 
a The figures in 1990 are annual average for the period 1980-1990, in 2000 for the period 1990-2000, 
and in 2010 for the period 2000-2010. 
 
Sources: Zhang (1997a, 1998). 
 
 
Table 2  Carbon taxes across regions in 2010 (at 1985 $ per ton of carbon) 
 
 USA Japan EEC Total OECD China World 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
53.4 
120.3 
55.9 
103.1 
85.7 
158.6 
62.7 
132.3 
10.1 
18.3 
45.1 
92.9 
 
Sources: Zhang (1997a, 1998). 
 
 
China's stance on JI 
 
Many Parties to the FCCC are keen to see JI as a key part of any protocol, although it is not without 
conceptual and operational problems (Zhang, 1997a, 1997b). For example, the US has incorporated JI in 
its Draft Protocol to the FCCC submitted on 17 January 1997 to its Secretariat. Then, what is China's 
stance on JI? At first glance, it would seem that JI should be in China's interest on the following 
grounds. 
 First, China is even more vulnerable to climate change than the developed countries, and a broad 
commitment to JI would also reduce the potential damage from climate change in China itself, since 
after all it is not only the developed countries whose climate will change if GHG emissions are not 
reduced. 
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 Second, driven by the threat of further degradation of the environment and the harmful economic 
effects of energy shortages, China is already determined to push energy conservation and enhanced 
energy efficiency in general and more efficient coal usage in particular. While taking such drastic 
domestic efforts, China badly needs assistance and economic and technical cooperation with the 
developed countries, because of very large amounts of capital and technical expertise required. In this 
regard, JI could provide an opportunity for China to get increased access to more advanced energy 
efficiency and pollution control technologies and additional funding. 
 However, the fact is that from the beginning, China, joining in many other developing countries, 
is strongly opposed to the concept of JI. With the support of many western environmental non-
governmental organisations, they have accused the developed countries of using JI as a means of buying 
their way out of responsibility for climate problems and at the same time postponing the radical changes 
in their own consumption patterns and passing the responsibility on to the developing countries. The fact 
that JI is voluntary and is based on the decision of both parties will probably not have much effect on 
their view. They have also expressed the fear that: 
 (i) all their low-cost abatement options would be used up so that they would face only high-cost 
options if they would be subsequently required to reduce their own emissions; 
 (ii) the OECD countries will redefine existing development aid projects as JI projects and thus 
reduce their aid budgets accordingly. Small developing countries particularly fear that JI will tend to 
shift the OECD countries' attention towards those developing countries with large economies and GHG 
emissions; and 
 (iii) developed countries may use JI to interfere their internal affairs, given that the 
implementation of JI projects across national borders touches on the issue of national sovereignty. 
 Acknowledging the strong opposition to JI in the developing world, the first Conference of the 
Parties to the FCCC in Berlin in April 1995 endorsed a pilot phase of JI referred to as activities imple-
mented jointly (AIJ) among Annex I Parties (i.e., OECD and countries with economies in transition) 
and, on a voluntary basis, with non-Annex I Parties (i.e., developing countries). During the AIJ pilot 
phase that ends no later than the year 2000, emission reductions achieved are not allowed to be credited 
to current national commitments of investor countries under the FCCC. However, because Annex I 
countries do not provide adequate domestic incentives to encourage their private sector participation in 
project financing, since inception of the pilot phase, there is a relatively small number of AIJ projects 
that have so far been officially reported to the FCCC Secretariat as being accepted, approved or 
endorsed by the governments of the host and investor countries. Moreover, the geographical distribution 
of these projects is quite uneven, with very few AIJ projects being established in Africa and Asia. Given 
the short time horizon of the AIJ pilot phase and the lack of a diversified base of the current AIJ 
projects, there would not be enough practical experience to provide an empirical basis for a decision on 
whether to move forward beyond the pilot phase, if the current pattern would continue. 
 
 
China in action 
 
The growing environmental concern built into both international and national programmes and China's 
rapid integration into the world economy tend to make China more amenable to international 
cooperation on the environment. Indeed, China has been supporting international cooperation on 
combating global warming in accordance with the principle of "common but differentiated 
responsibilities". China played an active role in preparing the FCCC and in the IPCC, co-chairing its 
Energy and Industry Subgroup of the Working Group III. At present, China is actively participating in a 
negotiating process aimed at producing a protocol or another legal instrument to deal with the threat of 
climate change in the post 2000 period in accordance with the "Berlin Mandate". Until now, the Chinese 
government has ratified the FCCC and China's Agenda 21, the latter serving as a white paper of China's 
population, environment and development in the 21st century. A National Group of Co-ordination on 
Climate Change has been established with the involvement of 18 ministerial agencies including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Planning Commission, the State Science and Technology 
Commission, the Ministry of Electric Power, the National Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
China Meteorological Administration. Its mission is to co-ordinate ministries and agencies in their 
efforts to address climate change, with the four working groups dealing with scientific assessment 
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(China Meteorological Administration and Chinese Academy of Sciences are in charge), impact 
assessment and response strategies (State Science and Technology Commission and National 
Environmental Protection Agency are in charge), economic implications (State Planning Commission 
and Ministry of Electric Power are in charge), and matters related to the Convention (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and State Science and Technology Commission are in charge) respectively. Marking the 
beginning of the process of developing China's response strategy for climate change, several projects 
have been initiated that deal with various aspects of climate change. Given the fact economic develop-
ment still remains priority for China, its climate policy will focus on the so-called win-win strategies. 
China has also made great efforts to abolishing current subsidies for energy consumption, reducing 
barriers to trade and to protecting intellectual property rights in order to facilitate the transfer and spread 
of economically viable low-carbon or carbon-free advanced energy technologies. All this at least 
indicates China's genuine concern about the potential impacts of climate change and its willingness to 
take all possible measures to limit the growth of its own per capita GHG emissions.  
 
 
Potential areas in China's interest 
 
If Annex I countries have showed that they are really taking the lead in significantly reducing their GHG 
emissions within a short time-frame and are living up to their commitments to providing adequate 
transfers of financial resources, technology and expertise, and if the four-year AIJ pilot phase turns out 
to be a success, then a increasing number of developing countries will become more positive to the 
concept of JI. Only then, there will be a reasonable prospect of joint implementation of abating GHG 
emissions between developed and developing countries, and China will no longer be sceptical about JI 
and tend to cooperate on JI projects. If this would be the case, what then are the potential areas in 
China's interest? 
 It is usually acknowledged that the success of JI premises an effective understanding of local 
(host country) development aspirations and the use of JI to push ahead with efforts to achieve these 
aspirations. Thus, in order to enhance their possibility of success, there is the need to make due 
consideration of local objectives and local conditions in designing JI projects. Considering that China is 
more concerned with local pollutants, such as SO2, NOx and particulates from coal burning, and regards 
them as its own environmental priorities, it is expected that the most potential areas of interest to China 
are related to those activities and options aimed at: (1) improving the efficiency of energy use, 
particularly at energy-intensive energy sectors (for example, iron and steel industry, chemical industry, 
building materials industry, and power industry) and devices (for example, industrial boilers); (2) 
pushing efficient use of coal through increasing proportion of raw coal washed; popularizing domestic 
use of coal briquette; substitution of direct burning of coal by electricity through development of large-
size, high-temperature and high-pressure efficient coal-fired power plants; expanding district heating 
systems and developing co-generation; increased penetration of town gas into urban households; and 
through development and diffusion of environmentally sound coal technologies; (3) speeding up the 
development of hydropower and nuclear power; and (4) developing renewables. These emission-abating 
options, though aimed at reducing GHG emissions, will contribute to the reductions of local pollutants 
and thus will be beneficial to a more sustainable development of the Chinese economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The extent to which non-Annex I countries would work together with Annex I countries in combating 
global warming would be contingent on Annex I countries really taking the lead in reducing their GHG 
emissions and providing adequate technology transfer and financing. This is the best means of 
encouraging developing country participation and convincing hitherto sceptical countries of JI as a cost-
effective climate measure. Moreover, given the breadth of the subject of JI and its close linkage with 
national sovereignty, global political agenda, and national development priorities, a wide and successful 
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implementation of JI will be conditional upon the consensus on a variety of operational issues such as 
the form of JI, criteria for JI, the establishment of baselines against which the effects of JI projects can 
be measured, and the verification of emission reductions of JI projects. Even if such a consensus would 
be reached, given the fact that AIJ/JI remains virtually unknown to the majority of social and economic 
sectors in China as in most developing countries, it is still unrealistic to expect that AIJ/JI projects with 
China work as smoothly and fast as the developed countries wish. This underlines the need to promote 
JI through pilot projects in China's interest and capacity building in China in order to make JI gain 
ground and provide mutual benefits to all the parties involved. Furthermore, the extent of China's 
cooperation on JI will to some extent depend on the certainties about climate change. This in turn 
underlines the need for the scientific community to continue its efforts to clarify the scientific basis for 
climate change problem in order to lower the uncertainties about its magnitude, timing and regional 
patterns. 
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